In a relatively low litigious environment like Australia, it is common to find IPO firms voluntarily provide forecasts in their prospectus. Using 158 Australian industrial IPOs listed from 1991 to 1997, we examine the impact of the disclosure and accuracy of earnings and dividend forecasts on equity pricing. Our results on the relationship between initial firm value and forecast disclosure policy of IPO firms are sensitive to the proxy of firm value used. Firms with inaccurate earnings and dividend forecasts experience adverse price reactions surrounding the day when the actual figures are released. They also have worse performance within the forecast window relative to firms with smaller and zero forecast errors. We do not find the adverse impact of forecast errors on share price extending beyond the announcement window.
Introduction
It is common to find Australian IPO firms to voluntarily include forecasts in their prospectus. 1 However, the vast volume of literature on voluntary disclosure focuses only on listed firms. Theoretical models attempting to explain the diverse disclosure practices amongst firms suggest that disclosure is a signal of favourable information (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985) or superior management quality (Trueman, 1986) . Empirical work, on the other hand, has attributed the provision of forecasts to aligning investors' expectations with management's assessments (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984) ; pre-empting bad news surprises (Skinner, 1994) ; attracting new capital (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson, 1995) ; and reducing the cost of capital (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1998) . Still, the generalisability of these theories and empirical evidence to start-up firms remains largely unexplored.
To date, only a few studies have examined the impact of forecast disclosure on the valuation (and underpricing) of IPO firms (examples include Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson, and Sefcik, 1992; ; How, 1996; Firth, 1998; Jog and McConomy, 1999) . Studies that focus on the effect of earnings forecasts on the initial market valuation tend to overlook the costs associated with forecasts that are less than perfectly accurate. This study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on the economic consequences of the provision of management earnings and dividend forecasts in the prospectus.
Our aims are threefold. First, we examine the impact of the act of forecast disclosure on the initial and long-term valuation of IPO firms. Second, we study the market reaction to the realisation of forecast errors. We do this by examining the share price reaction to the first announcement of actual earnings and dividend. Lastly, we examine the impact of forecast accuracy on share performance over the forecast window (measured from the listing month to the announcement month), the post-announcement window, and the first three years of IPO listing.
One unique feature of the Australian capital market that we factor in our empirical tests is the simultaneous announcements of earnings and dividends, which occur about 97% of the time (Brown, Finn and Hancock, 1977) . This feature permits us to examine the interaction effect, if any, between the earnings and dividend signals.
2
Our study has important implications to regulators. Any regulatory attempt to legislate forecast disclosure is based on the assumption that the market, if left alone, is incapable of producing desirable quantity and quality forecasts. 3 Most theoretical forecast disclosure models assume that voluntary disclosures are credible because of the possibility of legal penalties for misrepresentation. In an environment where the cost of disclosure (for legal penalties) is much lower, as is the case in Australia, 4 whether the market itself is sufficient to ensure quality disclosures (by means of adverse share price reactions and other costs when forecasts are not met) becomes an interesting question to address.
Our sample consists of 158 Australian industrial IPOs listed from 1991 to 1997.
About three-quarters of our sample firms included at least an earnings or dividend forecast in their prospectus. Our results show that the relationship between the firm's forecast disclosure policy (i.e., whether firms voluntarily provide earnings and/or dividend forecasts in their prospectus or not) and its initial value is sensitive to the measure of firm value used.
The relationship is significant when we proxy firm value by the firm's market-to-book ratio but not significant when we use the firm's post-IPO market capitalisation. 2 The Australian evidence indicates the presence of an interactive effect whereby dividend and earnings changes tend to reinforce each other (Brown et al., 1977; How, Teo and Izan, 1985) . Specifically, when the signals are in conflict, their joint impact on share price is lower than when they are in the same direction. Brown et al. (1977) suggest that earnings and dividends may be proxies for more fundamental informational determinants of share price, in which case efforts to provide separate effects for either dividends or profits may be pointless. 3 As evident from the US experience, to strike a balance between the usefulness and the reliability of forecast disclosure is not always easy. Prior to 1973, the Securities Exchange Commissions (SEC) imposed an exclusionary policy prohibiting forecasts in SEC filings. The exclusionary policy was founded on the belief that forecasts lack credibility and subject to management manipulation. This policy was subsequently reversed in 1973 by the enactment of Safe Harbour Rule (SEC rule 175). The exclusionary policy was criticised as it denied investors a valuable source of information, and only selective parties were given private access to corporate forecasts. The Federal Court of Australia imposes a positive duty on the firm to disclose forwardlooking information to investors in a take-over context (Pancontinental Mining Ltd v Goldfields Ltd (1992) ACLA 577). To our understanding, this precedent has not been extended to an IPO context. 4 The voluntary disclosure regime in Australia is thus somewhat similar to that in Canada, as detailed in Jog and McConomy (1999) , with a few exceptions. In Australia, prior to 1991, the uniform state Companies Codes and Act specified a checklist approach to prospectus approval by the regulator, and the provision of forecast information was not required. Still, companies did voluntarily provide forecasts, with evidence showing that these forecasts were highly inaccurate (Brown, Clarke, How and Lim, 2000) . The introduction of the Corporations Law in 1991 has increased both the frequency and accuracy of prospectus forecasts made in prospectuses. Unlike the disclosure regime in Canada, however, where securities authorities allow forecasts covering a maximum period of 24 months, there is no limit placed on the forecast horizon of Australian IPO firms. Further, although all prospectuses must have an unqualified auditor's report, firms choose to have their
We also find that firms with inaccurate forecasts of earnings and dividend experience adverse price reactions on days surrounding the release of actual earnings and dividend figures. The interaction effect between the earnings and dividend signals on share price appears to be dependent on the choice of window length. Firth (1998) and Jog and McConomy (1999) show that forecast errors are negatively related to IPO firms' long-run performance. We find support for this relationship only within the first year of listing. As most of our firms announce their first earnings and dividend prior to their first IPO anniversary, we re-examine this relationship over the forecast window as well as the post-announcement (3 to 18 months) window. Our results show that forecast errors explain the share price performance only within the forecast window. This suggests that the relationship between forecast errors and the first year post-IPO performance is due primarily to the announcement effect.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our data, and the results are reported in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Data
To ensure that only "unseasoned" issues are included in our sample, we exclude foreign owned or affiliated companies; companies either previously listed or registered on a foreign stock exchange before becoming listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX); companies formed through a scheme of arrangement; trust companies; and privatised public sector entities. We focus only on point forecasts in this study. Table 1 shows that about 75% of our sample firms provide point estimates of earnings or dividend forecasts, and 72% provide both earnings and dividend forecasts in their prospectus. Only about 22% of our sample firms do not provide a forecast.
<Insert Table 1 >
Panel A of Table 1 shows that about half of our sample firms went public during 1993 and 1994. As firms in different industries face different levels of competition and complexity, industry characteristics can influence the provision and accuracy of prospectus
forecasts. As such, we also report the distribution of our sample firms by industry in Panel B. As in Brown et al. (2000) , we group the industrial sectors into the following classes:
engineering/construction (ASX codes 6, 7, 10 and 11); consumer oriented (ASX codes 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15); diversified industries (ASX codes 21, 22 and 23); investment/finance (ASX codes 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20) ; and leisure/tourism (ASX code 24). Panel B shows that the investment/finance sector has the highest proportion of non-forecasting firms (52.17%).
The low incidence of forecast provision in this sector may be attributable to the difficulty in predicting incomes for these firms. This is because incomes deriving from investments are harder to predict than those deriving from manufacturing. <Insert Table 2> 3.0 Results
Does forecast disclosure influence the initial valuation of IPOs?
Relative to established firms, information asymmetries are likely to be more severe for IPO firms. Managers who attempt to resolve this information asymmetry problem may find that historical earnings figures included in the prospectus are inadequate in conveying their superior information about the firm. 6 As share prices are based primarily on future expectations of the firm's performance, management forecasts, which represent management's assessment of the firm's future prospects, are valued most of all by investors.
The inclusion of forward-looking information in the prospectus thus provides a means to alleviate the information asymmetry problem prevalent in the IPO market. However, forecasts are subject to error as they are noisy estimates of future cash flows. The large forecast error documented in the literature (Brown et al. 2000) questions the relevance of forecast information in the valuation process adopted by potential investors. 6 Past historical earnings are a poor predictor of future earnings given that they do not account for the expanded activities funded by the proceeds from the IPO (Firth, 1998) . In addition, important macroeconomic forces and changes in firm-specific variables are not captured in historical accounting numbers. The problem is more severe for young and start-up firms. Given that these firms are more likely to incur a high level of research and development, start-up and market building costs, their accounting numbers may not be representative of their true economic values. 7 In examining the usefulness of the comparable firm approach, Kim and Ritter (1999) find that price-multiples using forecasted earnings yield more accurate valuations than historical earnings.
Despite this, investors may nevertheless perceive forecast disclosure as highly relevant and useful. As described by Schneider (1972) , "reading a prospectus without soft information is like watching a performance of Hamlet with the role of prince unfulfilled… the viewer may get some interesting tidbits of background information, but very little idea of what the real story is about" (p.265). Also, if there are no external criteria determining the acceptable level of inaccuracy, it is more relevant to consider the accuracy of the forecast in comparison to other sources of forward-looking information (Kyrwood, 1998) . Hassell and Jennings (1986) and Waymire (1986) all show that management forecasts have less ex post inaccuracy compared to time-series model forecasts and analysts forecasts. This further substantiates that management forecast disclosure is perhaps the most relevant information source available to investors in valuing IPOs.
As investors are unable to assess the accuracy of the forecast information, several empirical regularities suggest that they tend to rely "blindly" on management forecasts.
Notwithstanding that analysts are able to detect management forecast biases, Hansen and Noe (1998) find that investors tend to rely more heavily on management forecasts despite the fact that analysts have issued revisions to the management forecasts. Only as additional information becomes available to investors regarding the relative accuracy of managers' and analysts' prediction, investors gradually incorporate analysts' revisions over the course of the fiscal year. Similarly, in an IPO context, Jog and McConomy (1999) show that firms with optimistic forecasts are significantly less underpriced than firms with accurate or conservative forecasts.
In line with Lev and Penman (1990) , who find that listed firms that disclose earnings forecasts experience an upward revision in their share price, we hypothesise that IPO firms that provide earnings and/or dividend forecasts have, on average, a higher initial market value than IPO firms that do not provide forecasts. To test this, we run the following regression model adapted from How (1996) : (Downes and Heinkel, 1982; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) , the first measure is the post-listing market capitalisation of IPO firms measured on the first day of listing (MKTCAP). The second measure is the ratio of market-to-book value of equity (MB) as in Firth (1998) . The determinants of VALUE are listed in Table 3 and are discussed below.
<Insert Table 3>
We propose that investors will demand a higher premium for IPOs with greater uncertainty about their value. Following this, IPOs with greater ex ante uncertainty will receive a lower initial market valuation, consistent with Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986) , and How et al. (1995) in an underpricing context. From these studies, we proxy ex ante uncertainty by SIGMA, GROWTH, and AGE. It is well established in the IPO literature that the issuer's choice of auditor and underwriter for the IPO can signal the issuer's quality and thus has a direct effect on the degree of underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Titman and Trueman, 1986; Balvers, McDonald and Miller, 1988; and How, et al., 1995) . In other words, investors can infer information about firm quality from the reputation of the auditor and underwriter associated with the issue. Following this, we argue that investors are likely to value firms associated with high quality auditors (AUDIT) and underwriters (UWRITER) more favourably than firms associated with low quality ones.
Issues with low demand take longer to be filled. As price is determined on the basis of demand and supply, the longer the delay period between the prospectus registration date to the subsequent listing date, DELAY, the lower is the initial market valuation. We also control for the impact of market condition on the initial valuation of IPOs. HOT takes a value of one for IPOs listed from January 1992 to August 1993 and zero otherwise. 9 Package
IPOs have higher ex ante uncertainty as they tend to be issued by young and risky IPO firms (How and Howe, 2000) . We thus expect package IPO firms (PIPOs) to have a lower firm value. 
< Insert Table 4>
The results from Table 4 appear to be sensitive to the choice of proxy used for VALUE. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find firms with earnings and/or dividend forecasts have higher market value as proxied by MKTCAP in Regressions I to III. This may be due in part to the highly subjective and biased nature of the forecasts. Given the costs associated with such disclosure, our results question why forecasts are provided at all.
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The results for the remaining independent variables are generally consistent with the literature. As predicted by Leland and Pyle's (1977) model, we find a positive and significant relationship between fractional ownership retained by issuers (ALPHA) and firm value (MKTCAP). Firms with a longer subscription period (DELAY) and higher ex ante uncertainty (SIGMA) have significantly lower firm value. So have firms that issue package IPOs (PIPO). As expected, the offer size is positively related to firm value since larger firms (as measured by post-listing market capitalisation) tend to issue larger offer size. These relationships are observed across Regressions I to III.
9 For a discussion on how the hot issue period in Australia is determined, refer to How and Yeo (2000) .
In comparison, when we proxy VALUE by MB in Regressions IV to VI, all the forecast variables are significant. This finding is consistent with Firth (1998) . Other significant determinants of MB are UWRITER (Regression IV only), GROWTH, OFFERS, and AGE. However, we note that variables that traditionally are significant in explaining firm value (e.g., ALPHA) do not appear to explain MB. Our results therefore question the appropriateness of market-to-book value of equity as a proxy for firm value. Given that GROWTH is the most significant explanatory variable for MB in our tests, and that the economic meaning of market-to-book value of equity is not well understood in the literature, our results suggest that perhaps market-to-book value of equity better proxies for growth potential rather than the value of IPO firms.
Does the market respond adversely to forecast errors?
One assumes that there are economic penalties in place to discourage inaccurate forecasts otherwise investors will not rely on them. The belief that forecast errors will magnify price volatility (Lees, 1981; Kaznik, 1999) and the fear of litigation (Skinner, 1994) when the forecast is proven inaccurate are commonly cited as disincentives to disclose forecast information. Assuming that the market is efficient, if investors have relied on forecast information in valuing IPOs, they should adjust their expectations accordingly when forecast outcomes are subsequently announced.
Since management forecasts cannot be verified at the point of provision, earnings (and dividend) announcements (subsequent to the release of the forecasts) are important in ex post evaluating the accuracy of these forecasts (Giggler and Hemmer, 1998) . For listed firms, McNichols (1989) and Lev and Penman (1990) show that management forecast errors are associated with changes in stock price. More importantly, inaccurate forecasts convey the impression that the firm is unstable, leading to the perception of high risk and therefore a lower share price (Lees, 1981) . Following this, we hypothesise that earnings and dividend forecast errors are negatively associated with abnormal stock returns surrounding the day of the announcement. That is, firms with large forecast errors have more negative price reaction on the announcement date than firms that deviate less from their forecasts. Although this is in line with the above existing work done on management forecasts in annual reports of established firms, to our knowledge, there has not been any study that has explicitly examined the stock price reaction relating to the verification of forecast errors in an IPO context.
To capture the market's reaction to the ex post revelation of forecast errors, we use both raw discrete and market-adjusted returns. The market-adjusted returns are computed using the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index (AOAI), which is a broad-based, valueweighted index. Forecast errors are commonly referred to as the difference between the actual and forecasted figures. In this study, the focus is on the accuracy of the forecast. The absolute forecast errors are employed as they measure the overall accuracy of the forecast, without considering whether the forecast is optimistic or pessimistic. 11 In addition, we use the squared forecast error to place greater weights on large errors. To account for differences in firm size across companies, we deflate the forecast errors by the offer price. 12 For robustness purposes, we also deflate the error by their forecasted figures. Although not reported, the results are not sensitive to the way the forecast error is measured.
In our sample, 20.35% exceeded both their earnings and dividend forecasts, while 10.62% failed to meet both forecasts. 13 The average earnings (dividend) forecast error in our study is 5.95% (1.21%) using the offer price as a deflator (Table 2 ). In testing the association 11 Although not reported, when signed forecasts are used, the relationship between forecast errors and share price performance is more significant. This means that firms that have actual results exceeded (fell short) their forecasted results experience an upward (downward) revision in share price. We are unable to infer these results beyond the positive relation found between forecast errors and share price performance as we do not have an appropriate benchmark to assess whether these forecasts were optimistic or pessimistic at the time of issuance. 12 There are 24 firms that provide a zero dividend forecast so using the offer price (instead of the forecasted figure) as the denominator allows us to estimate the forecast error. These firms were deleted from further analysis using the forecasted figure as a denominator. When examining the impact of forecast accuracy on the announcement of forecast outcomes, the forecast error is also deflated by the share price on the day prior to the commencement of the pre-specified window period. The use of the pre-announcement price is to capture any information leakage that has already been impounded into share price and account for size differences across companies. 13 Seven firms provide negative earnings forecasts in their prospectus. Of these, two firms exceeded their forecasts (positive forecast error), one met the forecast (zero forecast error), and the rest failed to meet their forecasts (negative forecast error).
between forecast errors and the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement windows (CAR), the following multiple OLS equation is fitted: Table 5 describes the determinants used in the regression, together with the expected sign of the relationship between the independent variables and abnormal returns.
<Insert Table 5>   Table 6 reports results from five regressions for CARs measured over the [-15, +15] announcement window. 14 Regression I shows that, as expected, both EFE and DFE have a negative coefficient. Only the former is significant at the conventional level. Our results therefore suggest that investors on average react significantly negatively to earnings forecast errors, with the adverse reaction being more severe for firms with a greater forecast error.
<Insert Table 6> There is also some evidence supporting the presence of listing drifts, proxied by underpricing and underpricing-squared. This is consistent with AfleckGraves, Hedge, and Miller (1996) , who show that the opening return and three-month risk adjusted returns for IPO firms are in the same direction, and Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) , who show that the price drifts may be longer, up to one-year.
15
The market reaction to the announcement of earnings forecast outcomes may also be attributable to other factors. Similar to previous studies, our sample firms typically announce their profit figures and dividend payout at the same time (Brown et al., 1977; How, et al., 1993) . In order to isolate the marginal information content of earnings and dividend announcements, we construct interactive dummies based on the directional change in earnings and dividend forecast errors (Kane, Lee, and Marcus, 1984) . We assign a dummy variable to each of the following six combinations of earnings and dividend forecast errors:
14 The results using the other windows are less significant but qualitatively similar. As such, they are not reported in this paper. 15 Stock price drifts are not a new concept. Such drifts are exhibited in investors' earnings announcements (Bernard and Thomas, 1989,1990) , share purchase annnouncements (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995) , seasoned equity offerings (Asquith and Mullins, 1983) and even dividend initiations and omissions (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995) . Table 6 , however, do not support the presence of an interactive effect of earnings and dividend announcements. Although not reported, we find the interactive effect to be significant for day [0] , and days [-1, +1] announcement windows.
A heavily traded and widely monitored firm has more publicly available information.
Mitra and Owers (1995) suggest that a dividend signal from a firm with low information environment may impart more new information to the market and have a greater wealth impact than a similar signal from a firm with high information environment. Firm size at the time of IPO proxies for information availability (How, et al., 1995) and is therefore incorporated in our regression. However, the results show that MKTCAP is not significant.
We also control for forecast horizon (HORIZON), measured in calendar days from the time the forecast is made (prospectus registration date) to the announcement date, in the event study. We expect the announcement effect to be less for firms with a longer forecast horizon. The longer the time lapse between the release of the forecast and the realisation of the forecast, the more information about the firm would have been released to the market.
Accordingly, investors would be less surprised by earnings and dividend outcomes when they are reported. However, this conjecture is not supported by the results in Table 6 , which shows that HORIZON is not a significant explanatory variable.
Dividend forecast errors tend to be correlated with earnings forecast errors (the correlation coefficient is 0.46) since earnings and dividend forecasts are based on the same set of determinants. When we run Regression II without DFE, results similar to the above are obtained. In Regression III, we take EFE out instead of DFE. The results show that when DFE is considered as the only forecast variable in the equation, the relationship between share price performance and dividend forecast error is significant. This suggests that dividend forecast error (in the absence of earnings forecast error) is also a significant determinant of the share price reaction on the announcement day.
In Regressions IV and V, we further segregate our sample into firms with positive and negative earnings forecast errors respectively. Here, we see that EFE is still significant as a determinant of CAR, and has a negative sign in both sub-samples. This suggests that the market penalises firms that deviate from their forecasts, including those that exceed their forecasts (i.e., the announcement bears "good news"). But it is worth noting that the estimated negative coefficient for EFE is much more significant in Regression V than in Regression IV. Therefore, the market appears to react more adversely to firms that overpredict (actual figures less than forecasted figures) their earnings than those that underpredict their earnings (actual figures more than forecasted figures).
In the split samples, underpricing, as represented by UNDSQR, remains significant.
IND is significant in Regression IV, and HORIZON is significant in Regression V.
Therefore, the cumulative abnormal return for firms that underestimated their earnings is lower for firms in the investment/finance sector than the rest. Firms that overestimated their earnings have a lower CAR if the time lapse between the forecast date and the announcement date increases.
The implication of forecast disclosure and accuracy on post-IPO performance
Large forecast errors are detrimental to managers' reputation. In the previous section, we saw firms that failed to meet their forecasts experience a drop in share price on the day when the error is realised. We propose in this section that the adverse impact of large forecast errors on share price may not be confined to the short-term announcement period.
This has support in King, Pownall and Waymire (1990) , who argue that the establishment of management's forecasting ability has implications on the credibility of subsequent management forecasts. Further, Williams (1996) finds that analysts' current forecasts are influenced by the accuracy of managers' prior earnings forecasts. Consistent with Firth (1998) and Jog and McConomy (1999) , who find that forecast errors significantly explain IPO firms' post-listing returns, we hypothesise that firms with larger forecast errors perform worse in the long-run than firms with smaller forecast errors.
The two commonly used return measures are cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). CARs cumulate the abnormal returns within the event window by adding them together, while BHARs are the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the expected return on a benchmark portfolio. When used to calculate long-run returns, both methods exhibit systematic biases (Roll, 1983; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; and Fama, 1998 
(-0),(0-) t + β 11 (+-),(-+) t + β 12 (+0),(0+) t + β 13 (++) t + ε t ---(3)
Regressions I and II in Table 7 present the results for the above equation using the first 12-month return as the dependent variable. Consistent with Firth (1998) <Insert Table 7> Other determinants of IPO long-run performance are also controlled for in Equation (3). Ritter (1991) shows that underpricing is negatively related to the firm's long-run abnormal return. The underpricing squared is used to account for the non-curvilinear relationship between underpricing and the long-run return observed in Lee, et al. (1996) and How (2000) . They also find the delay in listing (DELAY) to be significant in explaining the post-listing performance. OFFERS is an independent variable in Table 7 since smaller issues tend to perform worse than larger issues in the long-run (Ritter, 1991 (Kane et al., 1984) . Table 7 shows that apart from DELAY and some interactive variables, the results for these determinants are insignificant. Therefore, firms with a longer delay period between prospectus registration and subsequent listing have better first year post-listing returns, consistent with Lee et al., (1996) and How (2000) . Further, there appears to be some interactive effect of earnings and dividend on share price. Our results show that the coefficients for (+-),(-+) and (++) are significantly positive. Therefore, relative to firms with negative earnings and dividend forecast errors (i.e., (--)), firms with a positive forecast error for earnings and/or dividend have better one-year performance.
As noted earlier, the relationship between forecast errors and share performance is significant only for the one-year post-listing period. This suggests that the result for the oneyear return may be entirely due to the announcement effect of earnings and dividend. 17 We also noted above that about three-quarters of our sample announce their first earnings and dividend prior to their first IPO anniversary. Given that the effect of the timing difference on share performance may not be fully captured by a dummy variable (ANNOUNCE), we test the above conjecture by rerunning Equation (3) for returns computed over the forecast window, defined as the period from the first month of listing to the announcement month. 17 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
The results are reported in Regressions III and IV. We also report the results for the 3-month post-announcement window 18 in Regressions V and VI since the majority of our firms reach their first IPO anniversary about this time. We expect forecast errors to have a significant explanatory power for returns computed over the forecast window, but not beyond that.
As predicted, the results show that forecast errors explain the share price performance only within the forecast window. For the period subsequent to the announcement, forecast errors do not have any explanatory power. This suggests that the relationship between forecast errors and the first year post-IPO performance is due primarily to the announcement effect. It is also worthwhile to note that the interactive effect is much stronger over the forecast window. Therefore, dividend and earnings forecast errors tend to reinforce each other so that their joint impact on share price is increased if they are in the same direction.
As part of our aims, we also test whether the act of forecast (as opposed to forecast accuracy) affects the long-run IPO performance although the results are not reported. This provides a direct test of Trueman's (1986) proposition that the act of forecast rather than the information contained in the forecast that conveys superior managerial ability. We extend his argument further and propose that superior managerial ability, in turn, translates into better firm performance in the long-run. This has support in Clarkson et al. (1995) .
The results show that, when we segregate firms into earnings forecasters and nonearnings forecasters, the latter have an average return of -24% after three years of listing, significantly lower than the 6.9% observed for earnings forecasters. A similar finding is also observed for dividend and non-dividend forecasters. However, once other determinants of long-run IPO performance are controlled for, the multiple OLS regressions show no significant association between forecast disclosures and 12, 24, and 36-month post-IPO returns. In sum, the post-IPO performance does not appear to be explained by whether the firm has provided earnings and/or dividend forecasts in its prospectus or not.
Conclusion
The low litigious environment in Australia encourages voluntary forecast disclosure, with about 75% of IPO firms giving point forecasts in their prospectus. This study provides an analysis of the economic consequences associated with voluntary forecast disclosure in the Australian IPO market. We find that the relationship between initial firm value and forecast disclosure policy of IPO firms is sensitive to the proxy of firm value used. It is significant when we proxy firm value by the firm's market-to-book ratio but not when we use the firm's post-IPO market capitalisation. Our results suggest that these two proxies are perhaps not measuring the same thing.
We also test whether IPO firms' forecast disclosure policy can explain the long-run performance. We find support for this in our univariate tests. However, the explanatory power of the forecast disclosure policy disappears once other determinants are controlled for.
Using an event study methodology, we find that the market reacts negatively to earnings and dividend forecast errors. The adverse price reaction is more severe for firms with negative earnings forecast errors than those with positive errors. This suggests that the market itself is sufficient to ensure quality disclosures by means of adverse price reactions when forecasts are not met. Our results therefore question regulatory attempt to legislate forecast disclosure.
In line with Firth (1998) and Jog and McConomy (1998), we find that both earnings and dividend forecast errors are significant in explaining IPO firms' first 12-month post-IPO returns. However, when we further re-examine this relationship within the forecast window and post-announcement window, we find that the impact of forecast error is confined only to the forecast window. Our results therefore suggest that the relationship between forecast errors and IPO firms' post-listing performance is perhaps attributable to the announcement effect of earnings and dividend. 0.00 1.00 Descriptive statistics for variables in this study. EFE is the absolute earnings forecast error deflated by the offer price. DFE is the absolute dividend forecast error deflated by the offer price. MKTCAP is the firm's market capitalisation on the first day trading price. MB is the ratio of the first day closing price over the book value (net asset) per share. UND is the initial market return, measured as the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the offer price divided by the offer price. UWRITER is the maximum weighted dollar value of all shares underwritten by a given underwriter divided by the total dollar value of all IPOs in our sample. DELAY is the number of calendar days from the date of prospectus registration to the date of listing. SIGMA is the standard deviation of the first forty trading days' returns, excluding the initial return. GROWTH is one minus (net tangible assets backing per share divided by offer price). OFFERS is the product of offer price and the number of ordinary shares outstanding after the issue. AGE is the number of calendar days from incorporation to the date of prospectus. ALPHA is one minus the number of shares in the prospectus as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the IPO. AUDIT takes the value of one if the firm employs a Big 5 (Big 6) auditor, and zero otherwise. PIPO takes the value of one for package IPO, and zero otherwise. All dollar values are restated at 1998 dollars. The dependent variables are: MKTCAP, measured as the firm's market capitalisation on the first day of trading, and MB, measured as the closing price on the first day of trading over the book value (net asset) per share. Firms that provide earnings forecasts in their prospectus take the value of one, and zero otherwise for EPS. Firms that provide dividend forecasts in their prospectus take the value of one, and zero otherwise for DPS. EDPS is the product of EPS and DPS dummies. UWRITER is the maximum weighted dollar value of all shares underwritten by a given underwriter divided by the total dollar value of all IPOs in our sample. DELAY is the number of calendar days from the date of prospectus registration to the date of listing. PIPO takes the value of one for package IPO, and zero otherwise. SIGMA is the standard deviation of the first forty trading days' returns, excluding the initial return. GROWTH is one minus (net tangible assets backing per share divided by offer price). OFFERS is the product of offer price and the number of ordinary shares outstanding after the issue. Firms that employ one of the Big 5 (Big 6) investigating accountants take a value of one for AUDIT, and zero otherwise. ALPHA is one minus the number of shares in the prospectus as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the IPO. AGE is the number of calendar days from incorporation to the date of prospectus. HOT takes the value of one for IPOs listed during the hot issue period starting from January 1992 to August 1994, and zero otherwise. All dollar values are restated at 1998 dollars.
* denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.05 level ** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.01 level *** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.001 level. 
The signs in the parentheses denote the direction of the forecast error of earnings and dividend respectively. For example, firms with positive earnings and dividend forecast errors (i.e., these firms underestimate earnings and dividend forecasts) are assigned with a value of one for (++) and zero otherwise. The base case in our regressions is the (--) interactive term. [-15,15] . EFE is the absolute earnings forecast error deflated by the offer price. DFE is the absolute dividend forecast error deflated by the offer price. UND is the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the offer price deflated by the offer price. UNDSQR is the squared of UND. MKTCAP is the product of the offer price and the number of shares outstanding after the issue. HORIZON is the number of days from the prospectus registration date to the announcement date. IND takes the value of one for firms in the investment/finance sector, and zero otherwise. To control for the interactive effect between earnings and dividend signals, the signs in the parentheses denote the direction of the forecast error of earnings and dividend respectively. For example, firms with positive earnings and dividend forecast errors (i.e., these firms underestimate earnings and dividend forecasts) are assigned with a value of one for (++) and zero otherwise. The base case in our regression tests is the (--) interactive term. UE is actual earnings minus forecasted earnings. White's (1980) corrected T-values are stated in parentheses. For variables with predicted signs, one tailed test is used to determine the significance level; otherwise, a two-tailed test is employed. * denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.05 level ** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.01 level *** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.001 level Dependent variables are BHARs and CARs. BHARs are market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns computed from the closing price on the first trading day. CARs are cumulative decile-adjusted abnormal returns over the first 12 months from the closing price on the first trading day. EFE is the absolute forecast earnings error deflated by the offer price. DFE is the dividend forecast error deflated by the offer price. UND is the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the offer price divided by the offer price. UNSQR is the squared of UND. MB is the closing price on the first day of trading over the book value (net asset) per share. OFFERS is the product of the offer price and the number of shares on issue. DELAY is the number of days from the date of prospectus registration to the date of listing. ALPHA is one minus the number of shares offered in the prospectus as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the IPO. IND takes the value of one for firms in the investment/finance sector, and zero otherwise. ANNOUNCE takes the value of one for firms that announce their earnings (and dividends) prior to their first IPO anniversary, and zero otherwise. For the interactive effect between earnings and dividend signals, the signs in the parentheses denote the direction of the forecast error of earnings and dividend respectively. For example, firms with positive earnings and dividend forecast errors (i.e., these firms underestimate earnings and dividend forecasts) are assigned with a value of one for (++) and zero otherwise. The base case in our regression tests is the (--) interactive term. White's (1980) corrected T-values are stated in parentheses. For variables with predicted signs, one tailed test is used to determine the significance level; otherwise, a two-tailed test is employed. * denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.05 level ** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.01 level *** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.001 level
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